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Abstract
The recent period has highlighted a well-known phenomenon, namely the existence of a
positive bias in experts’ anticipations. Literature on this subject underlines optimism in the
financial analyst community. In this work, our significant contributions are twofold: we
provide explanatory bias prediction models which will subsequently allow the calculation of
earnings adjusted forecasts, for horizons from 1 to 24 months. We explain the bias using
macroeconomic as well as sector and firm specific variables. We obtain some important
results. In particular, the macroeconomic variables are statistically significant and their signs
are coherent with the intuition. However, we conclude that the microeconomic variables are
the main explanatory variables. From the forecast evaluation statistics viewpoints, the
adjusted forecasts make it possible quasi-systematically to improve the forecasts of the
analysts.
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Introduction  
Evaluating the reliability of analysts’ earnings forecasts is an important aspect of research for several 
reasons. In order to identify the unanticipated component of earnings, many empirical studies 
employ analysts’ consensus forecasts as a proxy for the market’s expectations of future earnings. 
Additionally, institutional investors make considerable use of analysts’ forecasts when evaluating and 
selecting individual shares. The performance of analysts’ forecasts sheds light on the process 
underlying market players’ expectations about key economic and financial variables, as the behaviour 
and use of earnings estimates have been widely studied since the 1970s (Crichfield, Dyckman and 
Lakonishok, 1978…).  
Herding and bias are among the main statistical observations regarding earnings forecasts behaviour. 
Herding (the incentive to conform that increases with the number of previous adopters) leads to an 
unusually narrow dispersion of individual analysts’ forecasts. Even when this narrow dispersion is 
irrational, it should not affect the accuracy of the average forecast. However, the evidence is strong 
that not only forecast dispersions, but also their means, are constantly biased. The recent period has 
highlighted a well-known phenomenon, the existence of a positive bias (in terms of earnings) in 
experts’ anticipations. In other words, the literature underlines the optimism in the financial analyst 
community (Brown, 1993; Dreman and Berry, 1995; O’Brien, 1988, Brous and Kini, 1993; Clayman 
and Schwartz, 1994; and Olsen, 1996...) and whether or not this forecast optimism is intentional is 
subject to debate between Efficient Market Hypothesis supporters and behavioural researchers. 
Francis and Philbrick (1993) attribute a positive bias in earnings forecasts to the analyst-management 
relation. A followed company’s management is found to be an important information source for 
financial analysts in predicting earnings. Analysts are anxious to accept the consequences of 
unfavourable forecasts imposed by a firm’s management, and therefore, are eager to produce overly 
optimistic reports. A second, more obvious explanation for a positive bias in earnings forecasts is the 
existence of a direct relationship between a followed company’s management and a following 
company’s management (cf. Lin and McNichols (1993) and Dugar and Nathan (1995)). Both 
explanations concern financial analysts’ conscious actions. Thus, the bias at issue may be labelled a 
reporting bias (see Francis and Philbrick (1993)). Alternative explanations relate to processing biases. 
If forecast errors are associated with unanticipated macro-economic information negatively affecting 
many firms, then, on average, financial analysts may overstate earnings (O’Brien 1988).  
In this work, our aim is to respond to the following question: can earnings forecasts be improved by 
taking into account the forecast bias? We develop an explanatory bias prediction model to calculate 
earnings adjusted forecasts. Previous studies of factors influencing bias have concentrated on the 
effect of a single variable. We explain the bias using macroeconomic, sector and firm specific 
variables. The contents are as follows: in the first section, we describe the anticipation database; 
specifically, we calculate the earnings forecast bias, validating its descriptive statistics. The second 
section details the explanatory variables selected, with the third section describing the estimated 
models’ characteristics. Study of the estimation results leads to the fourth section, which determines 
the adjusted earnings forecasts that we compare to analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
1. Data description  
Analysts’ forecasts are taken from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES), which collects 
forecasts from security analysts employed by institutional brokers and research firms. Our study is 
based on the consensus1
 
mean estimates of 16 countries, with companies belonging to the MSCI 
indices,2 3
 
for the period January 1990 to December 2002.  
                                            
1 We do not avoid the measurement bias to which a consensus is susceptible (cf. Capstaff et al., 1995), but using individual 
forecasts inevitably means there will be an element of double counting. Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) indicate that the 
double counting may result in forecast accuracy and bias being overstated. 
2 The definition of forecast and reported EPS varies from country to country but in most cases they are based on the EPS 
as used in published financial statements. For more detail and examples, see for instance Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001).  
3 It happens that 2 securities of the same firm differ only on tax arguments. In this case, the forecasts of benefit of only one 
were available in our sample. Since the forecasts were the same, we supplemented the base where necessary. 
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Table 1. Description of the sample 
Country Number of firms (%) Country Number of firms (%) 
Austria 2.77 UK 10.00 
Belgium 2.48 Italy 6.24 
Switzerland 6.14 Netherlands 2.77 
Germany 7.82 Norway 3.47 
Denmark 2.48 Portugal 1.49 
Spain 4.55 Sweden 4.75 
Finland 3.07 US 33.76 
France 8.22   
 
 US (%) Europe (%) 
Consumer Discretionary 16.62 15.47 
Consumer Staples 3.50 6.86 
Energy 5.54 3.36 
Financials 17.78 18.98 
Health care 6.71 4.82 
Industrials 14.87 23.07 
Information Technology 5.83 6.13 
Materials 11.95 14.01 
Telecommunication Services 4.37 3.36 
Utilities 12.83 3.94 
 
We selected all the companies followed, on average, by at least 6 analysts and for which three 
successive forecasts are available, so that the concept of consensus remains meaningful from both a 
spatial and temporal viewpoint. Only companies ending their fiscal year in December were selected 
for comparable horizons, and, indeed, most companies finish their fiscal year in December. The 
classification of the sample at country level highlights the predominant weight of the US in terms of 
the number of firms’ earnings anticipations, with 33.76% of the firms. The UK, France and Germany 
follow. The classification of the sample at sector level highlights the predominant weight of the 
financial and consumer discretionary firms for the US and of industrial and financial firms for the 
European panel.  
Forecast errors constitute an invaluable indicator, allowing us to judge the quality of analysts’ 
estimates. Over several successive horizons, the forecasting errors provide information a posteriori 
for the way in which analysts revise their anticipations. They enable us to see whether analysts are 
mistaken about performance by systematically over or underestimating it. Analysts' forecasting error 
(AFE) is computed as the average earning per share (EPS) forecast minus the last forecast4 (before 
publication) of the EPS being the subject of the forecast reported by IBES, divided by the absolute 
value of the last EPS forecast (before publication);5 nonzero AFE provides an obvious bias. The 
statistic of the bias is defined as follows:  
T,i
T,iT,h,i
T,h,i
F
)FF(
AFE
−
=                 (1) 
                                            
4
Choosing the last forecast before publication, without taking published earnings into account, allows us to distinguish 
between the bias forecast and the surprise (i.e. exceptional results, mainly due to the fact that firms record provisions on 
acquisitions, change their dividend policy, …). 
5Because of the delay in reporting earnings, the actual earnings are not known after the year has ended.  
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where T,h,iF  corresponds to the forecast of earnings per share of company i, concerning its fiscal 
year T, calculated on a horizon h; and T,iF  represents the last forecast (before the publication) of the 
EPS being the subject of the forecast.6  
Outliers are evident in the upper and lower tails of the AFE distribution. In order to eliminate undue 
influence by extreme values, distributions are winsorized at ±1% for all subsequent analysis. 
However, as Collins and Hopwood (1980) point out, “there is no unique definition or value that 
defines an outlier.”7 
The bias was calculated by country, sector and horizon. Concerning the forecasting horizon, we 
selected horizons from 24 months to 1 month (before the last forecast). 
  
2. Bias forecasting model  
Explanatory variables were chosen based on existing literature (cf. Dossou, Lardic, Michalon, 2004) 
and on a priori results from a statistical study of the bias. The selected variables are macroeconomic 
and individual. 
  
 2.1. Macroeconomic variables  
Some authors have underlined a link between economic growth and analysts’ forecasts. When 
economic growth strengthens, actual earnings accelerate toward the normally optimistic forecasts, so 
forecasting errors decline. If economic growth is very strong, earnings rise well beyond the forecasts: 
analysts end up under forecasting earnings for a while. When the economy begins to slow down, 
earnings start declining too, yet analysts’ optimism prevents a drastic downward revision in their 
forecasts. Therefore, forecasting errors increase in size. Emanuelli and Pearson (1994) described an 
approach to global asset allocation that relies on estimate revisions: recognizing that biases in 
earnings forecasts are linked to the business cycle and adjusting earnings forecasts to reduce the bias 
will improve the performance of such global asset allocation strategies. Due to the monthly 
availability of production data, we used industrial production growth to measure economic activity. 
We introduced the following other variables in the model: year-over-year inflation growth,8 annual 
exchange rate growth (US dollar performance against domestic currency for the European model and 
CEERUS9
 
for the US model) and interest rate slope curve (long interest rate – short interest rate). 
We expect a negative sign for industrial production growth and the slope curve and a positive one for 
annual inflation growth. Note that due to adoption of the Euro, European economies will integrate 
over time, which should eliminate the interest and inflation differences between countries in the 
European model. Moreover, we could have used variables of anticipation; La Porta (1996), Dechow 
and Sloan (1997) and Rajan and Servaes (1997) showed that analysts are all the more optimistic in 
their forecasts when anticipated growth is strong. However, anticipated data never appears significant 
in our study.  
                                            
6We use the last earnings forecast as a deflator. Various other deflators including price and/or the previous level of 
earnings, have been used in other studies. Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) indicate they have replicated their tests using 
different deflators and have found the results to be qualitatively similar.  
7Fried and Givoly (1982) and Capstaff et al. (1995) truncate observations for which forecast error exceeds 100%. Elton et 
al. (1984) and O’Brien (1988) include in their sample only those companies for which initial earnings are above $0.20 per 
share. Capstaff et al. (1995) and Harris (1999) exclude companies for which forecast earnings growth or actual earnings 
growth exceeds 100%.  
  
8 Chordia and Shivakumar (2005) show that part of the drift anomaly is attributable to the inflation illusion argument of 
Modigliani and Cohn (1979). They explain that whereas bond market investors understand the impact of inflation on 
discount rates, stock market investors do not account for the impact on future earnings growth.  
Basu, Markov and Shivakumar (2005) found that expected inflation proxies (such as lagged inflation) predict future earnings 
growth of a portfolio long in high-SUE (Standardized Unexpected Earnings) firms and short in low-SUE firms, but analysts 
do not fully adjust for this relation. They conclude that analysts’ earnings forecasts are not fully efficient with respect to 
earnings information in inflation. Inflation illusion will cause firms with positive earnings sensitivities to inflation to be 
undervalued and stocks with negative earnings sensitivities to inflation to be overvalued. 
9Effective exchange rate index (weighted by trades).  
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 2.2. Microeconomic variables  
Harris (1999) undertook a study of the accuracy, bias and efficiency of analysts’ forecasts of long-run 
earnings growth for US companies over the period 1982-1992, showing that analysts’ forecasts do 
not incorporate all information available at the time of the forecast. In addition, much of analysts’ 
forecasting error is at the individual firm level. The inability of analysts to forecast average earnings 
growth in the economy does not contribute substantially to their inaccuracy. However, there is 
evidence that the level of aggregation at which analysts’ errors are being made is changing over time, 
with increasing accuracy at the industry level and decreasing accuracy at the firm level. In order to 
take firm specific information into account, we retained the following variables:  
•  The coefficient of variation (called Lcv in the regressions), i.e. the dispersion between 
analysts’/absolute value of the average EPS (cf. for instance De Bondt and Forbes, 1999). This 
variable corresponds to an indicator of uncertainty, or the degree of disagreement between the 
estimates: the more uncertain the universe, the larger the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. In 
particular, it suggests that one expects this variable to be more explanatory over long horizons 
(where uncertainty is stronger) than over shorter horizons (increasing visibility of the company’s 
prospects), as with small capitalizations rather than major ones. We expect a positive coefficient 
for this variable, the bias range proportionally increasing with analyst disagreement. The relative 
variation of the forecast (called Delprev) corresponds to the percentage difference between 
current forecast and the first forecast earnings. The more analysts revise their forecasts in a given 
year, the smaller the bias.  
• The firm capitalization. Das et al. (1998) and others found that optimistic bias is more 
pronounced in firms whose earnings are relatively difficult to predict from publicly available 
information. Lim (2001) provides theory and evidence that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more 
optimistically biased for firms with less predictable earnings. Similarly, Das, Levine and 
Sivaramakrishnan (1998) report a positive relation between optimistic bias and the 
unpredictability of analysts’ earnings forecasts, i.e. in smaller firms. In Dossou, Lardic and 
Michalon (2004), we showed the importance of stock exchange capitalization as a discriminating 
variable: concerning the United States,10 one observed that the mean bias is weaker for large 
capitalizations than for others. The spread, however, tends to decline with the forecasting 
horizon. In addition, the spread is essentially due to the positive mean bias: the experts tend to 
overestimate the benefits for moderate sized companies. One can attribute this phenomenon to 
the amount of public information available concerning each firm group; the less information the 
experts have, the more they will tend to overestimate their forecasts in order to ensure that they 
do not finally underestimate the benefit.  
• The price variation between the last earnings announcement and the previous month (called Var-
p in regressions).11 Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985), Brown, Hagerman, Griffin and Zmijewski 
(1987), Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell (1991) et al., and Klein and Rosenfeld (1992) 
documented evidence that forecasting errors can be predicted by prior period stock returns. A 
significant price increase corresponds to good results. The published earnings will converge 
towards expected earnings, thus reducing the bias. As such, we expect a negative sign for the 
coefficient.  
• Net revisions (called Lecart) are defined as the number of downward revised estimates minus the 
number of upward estimates. This is an activity indicator. This variable implicitly measures the 
                                            
10 Similar behaviour for bias was observed for the United Kingdom, but for Germany and France, the spread (in terms of 
bias for the two sub-groups of capitalization) is weaker. Even in Germany, one observes spreads between the positive mean 
bias that are compensated by the spreads between the negative mean bias. This heterogeneity by country is also observed at 
the sector level (Figures 8.1 to 8.4): for the materials and industrial sectors. Biases associated with the largest capitalizations 
are weaker than those associated with moderate capitalizations. On the other hand, for the consumer, discretionary and 
financial sectors, sub-sample bias is indistinguishable regardless of the horizon for finance and over long horizons for the 
consumer discretionary sector. 
11Prices come from the IBES MSCI database.  
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uncertainty of the environment. We do not capture the importance of the revisions with this 
variable (positive and negative).  
• Number of analysts (called NA): we expect a negative relation between the bias and the number 
of analysts. Moreover, a priori, we expect a substantial correlation between the number of 
analysts and the firms’ market capitalization. We will then need to take care of colinearity 
relationships.  
 
3. Regression results  
Given the number of countries (16) and forecasting horizons (24) we chose to retain only certain 
forecast horizons and group the countries in two clusters, namely the United States and Europe. This 
choice of two clusters was also guided by the fact that for certain European countries, the number of 
observations is relatively weak. Other pooling could have been carried out, particularly by sector. 
However, it appeared more relevant to retain a country rather than a sectorial pool: given the 
constitution of our sample (cf. Table 1), the significant weight of the American companies would 
have systematically dominated the more specific behaviours of the smaller countries. However, it is 
important not to neglect the existence of a sectorial effect. It was taken into account through the 
introduction of additive sectorial dummies to our regressions. In particular, Dossou, Lardic and 
Michalon (2004) found some sectors more prone to bias: information technology, materials, 
telecommunications and to a lesser extent, industrials and the consumer discretionary sectors. The 
utilities sector is characterized by the weakest mean bias regardless of the horizon. Capstaff et al. 
(1999, 2001) have also shown that earnings forecast accuracy differs by the industry covered.  
Concerning the European sample, we also introduced additive country dummies in order to take the 
unique characteristics of each country in the zone into account; the behaviour of reported EPS may 
be influenced by accounting practices that either understate or exaggerate the underlying earnings 
behaviour12
 
(cf. Rees, 1998; Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees, 2001).  
Finally, we estimated the following model:  
it
1C
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1s
ss
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−
=
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            (2) 
with i= 1, …, I  the number of securities ; t=1, …, T, the number of periods, s= 1, …, S the number 
of sectors and c=1, …,C the number of countries (for the European regression only), jihtx  
corresponds to the jth micro-economic variable specific to the firm i at date t, ltx  corresponds to the 
lth macro-economic variable at date t, and sDU  and cDU  correspond to additive dummy variables 
corresponding respectively to the sector and to the firm’s sector and country.  
We adopt a two-way effect model, a specification that depends on both the cross-section and time 
series to which the observation belongs. The specification of the error terms is the following: 
ittiit eu ξ++υ=  where itξ  is an error term with zero mean and a homoscedastic covariance 
matrix. 
Concerning the nature of the cross-sectional and time series effects, Hausman’s specification test is 
used to test hypotheses for inconsistency of the estimator. Given a model in which fixed effects 
estimation would be appropriate, a Hausman test determines whether random effects estimation 
would be almost as accurate. The consistency of a random effects model depends on the assumption 
that the iυ  are uncorrelated with regressors in the model. If they are correlated, the estimates are 
inconsistent.13 In a fixed-effects case, the Hausman test is a test of the null hypothesis that random 
                                            
12Note accounting effects are weaker in larger firms cross-listed on multiple exchanges that have generally adopted US 
accounting principles.  
13Note in small samples the net result of the trade-off efficiency versus consistency is not easy to derive analytically. The 
GLS approach is often found to perform better overall. Moreover, fixed effects models use up all between units variation 
and therefore do not allow including time-invariant variables in the model, as these are collinear with the set of unit-specific 
indicators representing the fixed effects. The random effects model permits the use of time-invariant variables.  
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effects would be consistent and efficient, versus the alternative hypothesis that random effects would 
be inconsistent (in which case fixed effects would certainly be consistent). The result of the test is a 
vector of dimension k which will be distributed chi-square(k), where k is the number of explanatory 
variables in the model. So, if the Hausman test statistic is large, one must use fixed effects. If the 
statistic is small, one may get away with random effects. In Tables 2 and 3, we report these test 
results for the US and European regressions respectively. At 10%, we systematically decide in favour 
of the null hypothesis. Ultimately, we adopt a two-way random effects structure for the errors of the 
model (i.e. stochastic random components). The estimation method is an estimated generalized least 
squares procedure that involves estimating the variance components and then using the estimated 
variance covariance matrix obtained to apply the GLS to the data. The Wansbeek and Kapteyn 
(1989) method is used to handle our unbalanced data.  
The first regressions convinced us of the need to modify the model, in particular by introducing 
sectorial dummies (and country dummies for the European zone) of a multiplicative nature. 
Concerning the European model, we explicitly wanted to see whether or not the country in question 
was an EU member; as a result, we introduced multiplicative country dummies for the macro-
economic variables in the European model. For the microeconomic variables, we introduced 
multiplicative dummies by country and/or sector. However, in order to avoid overloading the model, 
we chose the European model to introduce a multiplicative dummy only for the 6 largest countries 
(in terms of number of companies) and the 4 largest sectors (financials, materials, consumer 
discretionary, and industrials). For the US model, we tested the significance of multiplicative dummy 
variables for all the sectors and micro-economic variables.  
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that we know that some analysts do their forecasts simultaneously. For 
instance, anticipations at 1 and 13 month horizons (respectively named FY1 (from one to twelve 
months) and FY2 (from 13 to 24 months) in the IBES tables) are done simultaneously (that is also 
valid for the 2 and 14 month horizons …). In other words, the available information sample at a 
given date is the same for these horizons. One can consequently expect a strong correlation between 
the analysts’ forecasts of these horizons. This intuition is confirmed by the recent European study of 
Beckers, Steliaros and Thomson, (2004) who show no distinguishable difference in analyst dispersion 
for FY2 and FY1 forecasts.14 They conclude that most European analysts focus their attention on the 
FY1 period, with the longer term forecasts, on average, treated as an afterthought. In other words, in 
regressions over horizons h+12 months (h=1, …,12) , we introduced the adjusted forecasting error 
(named AFE*) of the corresponding horizon h, the latter coming from the estimate of the equation 
for the horizon h. Note that replacing the variables representing "the information sample of the  
analyst" with the forecasting error, which includes the forecast made for the horizon h (resp. (h+12)), 
makes it possible to implicitly consider the analysts’ information set.  
Table 2 contains US regression results for the 1 to 24 month horizons. Of course, we preserved only 
the significant (at 5%) explanatory variables in each model.  
                                            
14 Their study covers European countries over the period 1993-2002. They also show that a comparison with US FY2 and 
FY1 forecasts for the S&P 500 constituent index implies that herding may be more pronounced in Europe than in the 
United States. 
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Table 2.  Regression Results US 
  1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 13 months 15 months 18 months 21 months 24 months 
Intercept 0.007* 0.058 0.101 0.098 0.035* -0.05107ns -0.04347ns 0.08701 -0.05096ns 0.05957 
AFE*      0.319203* 0.346959 0.498364 0.647909 0.754977 
Inflation Growth     0.024* 0.036543 0.039141  0.034296  
Change Growth     0.754 0.784928 0.395182*  0.675488  
Industrial Production Growth  -0.507 -0.671 -0.532*       
Slope -0.004* -0.008* -0.014* -0.017* -0.016*      
Lcv 0.06 0.198 0.349 0.142 0.361 0.068722 -0.24203 -0.11842 -0.21451* -0.07489 
Var_P -0.033 -0.132 -0.093 -0.087* -0.206 -0.16659 -0.09732    
Delprev 0.054 0.06 0.059 0.058 0.049 -0.03305 -0.02279 -0.05305   
Lecart 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004  0.002723    
Energy 0.032 0.051 0.117 0.047* 0.065  0.219762 0.200137   
Materials 0.027 0.081 0.125 0.05 0.029*    0.083091  
Consumer Discretionary 0.024  0.042        
Consumer Staples     -0.029*      
Utilities     -0.012*   -0.06695   
Industry       0.073104* 0.083503   
            
Adjusted R² 0.198 0.233 0.188 0.129 0.116 0.089 0.105 0.0802 0.0684 0.0788 
Endogeneous Variable mean 0.0204998 0.0438707 0.0642208 0.0639397 0.0800146 0.076 0.0856 0.0947 0.097 0.114 
Endogeneous Variable std 0.0875966 0.153663 0.2038852 0.2200625 0.248034 0.2444 0.248 0.257 0.265 0.279 
Variance Component for Cross Sections 0.0029 0.0035 0.0121 0.003 0.0042 0.0018 0.078 0.0089 0.0066 0.0079 
Variance Component for Time Series 0.000094 0.00036 0.00127 0.0015 0.0032 0.0032 0.0026 0.0023 0.0024 0.000217 
Variance Component for Error 0.0049 0.0153 0.0309 0.038 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.053 0.054 0.059 
Hausman Test for Random Effects 34.38 32.35 30.58 25.7 21.12 14.02 20.97 17.47 14.91 16.7 
Number of Cross Sections 286 314 312 298 283 259 263 256 252 243 
Time Series Length 14 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 11 
* signif. only at 10%. Note that the variable number of analysts was never significant because of colinearity relationships with firms’ market 
capitalization.  
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Table 3. Regression Results Europe 
  1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 13 months 15 months 18 months 21 months 24 months 
Intercept 0.010834* 0.016656* 0.036052 0.066824 0.113531 0.094981 0.073517 0.111482 0.080511 0.05524 
AFE*      0.162603 0.457323 0.535534 0.601029 0.425738 
Industrial Production Growth -0.26063 -0.24572  -0.15601* -0.4188 -0.42619 -0.47233    
Inflation Growth 0.006173 0.00908 0.009149    0.009636   0.01671 
Change Growth  -0.12907 -0.19655 -0.16249 -0.28567 -0.43817 -0.25132 -0.4412 -0.30971 -0.25281 
Slope  -0.011 -0.00961 -0.00838 -0.00668*     -0.01169 
Lcv 0.065139 0.065304 0.021651  0.047834 0.015949 -0.17003 -0.41156 -0.37553 -0.07817 
Var_P -0.0845 -0.14125 -0.11097 -0.08524 -0.22415  -0.16195  0.081032  
Delprev   0.016144 0.010046 0.03355  0.073316 -0.05266 -0.04197 0.096338 
Lecart 0.003343 0.004093 0.010352 0.01245 0.004937    -0.00729  
Finance      -0.06203 -0.03967   -0.07663 
Materials  0.036652 0.054748  0.050183  0.041238    
Industry  0.049188 0.050737 0.043294 0.03044   0.083973 0.04796  
Consumer Discretionary  0.041398 0.059648    0.038722  0.077827  
Information Technology 0.060779 0.074972 0.078871 0.11811       
Italy    -0.08892  0.066444  -0.09751   
France      0.050715     
Finland   -0.06161  -0.06661      
Switzerland   0.034654*      0.091487 0.301896 
Norway   0.039746*        
Netherlands  -0.05055*         
UK  -0.03731   -0.03993*   -0.08137   
Sweden 0.049586 0.089846 0.089825   0.072895     
Germany     -0.06473 0.168545 0.173174  0.288455  
Austria     -0.08814      
Spain     -0.03853*      
            
Adjusted R² 0.181 0.155 0.149 0.119 0.123 0.094 0.103 0.1335 0.1063 0.0936 
Endogeneous Variable Mean 0.055 0.067 0.074 0.077 0.09 0.088 0.095 0.095 0.088 0.099 
Endogeneous Variable std 0.185 0.215 0.25 0.274 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.307 0.319 0.327 
Var. Component for Cross Section 0.026 0.016 0.0094 0.017 0.0093 0.0078 0.004 0.00423 0.015 0.0209 
Var. Component for Time Series 0.00055 0.000428 0.0017 0.0021 0.0034 0.00501 0.0042 0.0039 0.005 0.0045 
Var. Component for Error 0.025 0.0345 0.0473 0.058 0.065 0.0638 0.066 0.064 0.066 0.073 
Hausman Test for Random Effects 30.27 30.78 30.89 33.34 37.55 29.33 31.16 29.60 26.07 31.24 
Number of Cross Sections 616 587 570 557 516 499 473 442 429 391 
Time Series Length 14 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 11 
*: signif. only at 10%. Note that the variable number of analysts was never significant because of colinearity relationships with firms’ market 
capitalization. 
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Let us recall that we do not work with a constant sample: so the comparative results according to 
horizons must be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the dynamics of the mean and standard 
deviation of the endogenous variable (the bias) according to the forecast horizon appear relatively 
coherent. We observe adjusted R² going from 23% at 3 months to 7.88% at 24 months, which is 
weak, but it should not be forgotten that we not only work with panel data (which is a relatively 
heterogeneous sample) but also that our endogenous variable is a forecast bias. Moreover, we 
observe that the temporal dimension bias is much lower than the space dimension. As the variance 
decomposition indicates, heterogeneity is primarily a space component.  
The coefficient signs of the macroeconomic variables are consistent with expectations. In particular, 
for the slope curve, the negative coefficient conveys the fact that a long-term rate higher than a 
short-term rate indicates good economic health and thus a mechanically weaker forecast bias (not 
because the analysts are less optimistic, but because the published earnings are higher). Note that the 
link between forecasting errors and the business cycle contrasts with the findings of Dreman and 
Berry (1995), who found that forecasting errors are not meaningfully affected by the business cycle.15 
Furthermore, we are in agreement with Basu, Markov and Shivakumar (2005): analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors can be predicted using lagged inflation; analysts suffer from inflation illusion.  
Regarding microeconomic variables, we find the anticipated signs for some variables, such as Var_p 
(the price variation between the last earnings announcement and the previous month), are always 
negative. However, for a range of other variables, such as Lcv (the coefficient of variation), the 
coefficient is positive (as expected) for short horizons and negative for horizons above 13 months, 
which is more difficult to explain. An interpretation of this result could lie in the introduction of the 
variable AFE* into regressions over long horizons, which already implicitly introduces variables such 
as Lcv into the regression. We may also observe that macro-economic variables intervening over 
short horizons and long horizons are not the same, which can be interpreted in a way similar to Lcv.  
In addition, the coefficient of variation is the variable for which heterogeneity is strongest (where we 
have the most multiplicative dummies, for the US and Europe). For Europe, dummy countries 
intervene in addition to sectorial dummies. The coefficient of AFE* is always positive and increases 
with the horizon. There are fewer and fewer explanatory variables that are significant with the 
horizon and the adjusted R² declines quickly. All these elements tend to show that analyst forecasts 
over long horizons are peripheral to the forecast carried out simultaneously for the 12 month former 
horizon. Capitalization is never significant, which is in line with Beckers’ result (2004). We obtain a 
similar result for the number of analysts.  
Table 3 corresponds to the results obtained for our sample’s European countries. For macro-
economic data, the UK dummies are frequently significant, in particular for industrial production 
growth and inflation growth. We interpret this finding as indicative of a differentiation according to 
the members of the EuroZone.  
 
4. Adjusted Earnings Forecasts 
In sum, our aim is to apply a monthly expected earnings correction for each of the markets (US and 
Europe) over a one year period. The market’s total earnings are equal to the sum of the total earnings 
of companies belonging to the market.  
Regression models presented in the previous section are now used. Accordingly, we adopted the 
following step: the “1 month” model is used to estimate bias over 1 and 2 month horizons; the “3 
months” model is used to estimate bias over 3, 4 and 5 month horizons, etc…  
 
We can estimate the bias of each company at each date: 
*
,, thiAFE .16 From the estimated bias, one 
can then correct each forecast ThiF ,,  and obtain an adjusted forecast:  
                                            
15 Why do investors underestimate the significance of current macroeconomic conditions for future earnings? One 
hypothesis is the constantly changing nature of the economic system within which market participants make earnings 
forecasts (see Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005).  
16 For instance, for a forecast on 31/12/94, we estimate a bias from Dec. 1993 (horizon 12) to Nov. 1994 (horizon 1).  
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)1( *
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Thi
Thi
Thi AFE
F
F
+
=                  (3) 
To take into account potential index rebalancing (companies going in or out of the index), we are 
choosing to retain the number of outstanding shares as of December.  In this way, month by month, 
the structure weight of the market remains constant ( ∑
=
=
n
i
iss
1
 with si , the number of outstanding 
shares for the firm i in December). Finally, for each date, we calculated the forecasted earnings 
( hTiiThi FsB ,,, = ), adjusted forecasted earnings (
*
,
*
, hTiihTi FsB = ) and last EPS forecast (before 
publication) for each firm and horizon (1-12). We deducted the forecasted earnings 
( ∑
=
=
n
i
ThiTh BB
1
,,,
) (that we named “IBES” in the following figures), adjusted  ( ∑
=
=
n
i
ThiTh BB
1
*
,,
*
,
) 
(that we named “Adjusted Forecasts” in the following figures) and last earnings forecast before 
publication (that we named “Earnings”) for each country and horizon. 
In Tables 4 to 7, we developed forecast evaluation statistics for the 4 main countries. The RMSE 
(root mean squared error) and the MAE (mean absolute error) depend on the dependent variable’s 
scale. These should be used as relative measures to compare forecasts for the same series across 
different models; the smaller the error, the better the forecasting ability of that model according to 
that criterion. The MAPE (mean absolute percentage error) is scale invariant. The Theil’U (Theil 
inequality coefficient) always lies between zero and one, where zero indicates a perfect fit.  
 
Table 4. RMSE statistics 
 1-24M 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 13M 15M 18M 21M 24M 
US            
IBES Forecast 11800.55 1946.91 5111.57 9608.4 10038.58 11347.76 9892.74 13992.58 14186.92 14194.58 14269.44 
Adjusted Forecast 9398.33 1058.45 3641.70 4279.3 6721.96 7102.70 5064.21 9007.05 12450.65 8275.93 8385.45 
France            
IBES Forecast 2204.41 1200.38 1817.53 2106.2 2193.20 2567.27 2254.82 2399.41 2327.14 2272.10 1499.26 
Adjusted Forecast 1799.01 735.64 1112.25 1466.5 1547.17 1159.98 1573.53 1810.09 2352.58 2769.93 1361.59 
Germany            
IBES Forecast 1318.72 882.60 1188.52 1261.4 1197.00 1376.77 1367.93 1373.41 1253.80 1067.50 1016.12 
Adjusted Forecast 914.20 472.92 653.89 816.70 849.06 1025.12 1125.73 881.81 799.84 622.78 568.83 
UK            
IBES Forecast 2691.58 886.44 924.66 1742.7 2107.59 2954.04 3045.89 3273.29 3185.44 3164.18 3114.34 
Adjusted Forecast 1921.20 758.35 726.45 1089.2 1590.88 1661.92 1997.65 2031.66 2267.52 2270.78 2871.44 
N.B.: The RMSE (root mean squared error) is defined as follows: ∑
=
−=
T
1t
t
f
t )earningsearnings(
T
1
RMSE , where 
T corresponds to the number of periods in the forecasting, ftearnings  corresponds to the IBES earnings  
forecast or to the adjusted earnings forecast and tearnings  is the last earnings forecast before publication. The 
grey areas are the cases where we don’t improve analysts’ forecast quality.  
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Table 5. MAE Statistics 
 1-24M 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 13M 15M 18M 21M 24M 
US            
IBES Forecast 8739.98 1443.62 3477.63 6712.23 7279.14 8756.35 7533.25 10382.22 10678.89 11423.05 11653.59 
Adjusted Forecast 5947.38 902.53 2833.39 3266.54 4932.31 4871.91 4266.89 7390.67 8360.66 6502.15 6255.38 
France            
IBES Forecast 1709.08 900.95 1386.29 1699.16 1683.82 1956.02 1826.42 1906.30 1721.65 1586.73 1008.30 
Adjusted Forecast 1226.18 529.23 723.67 1183.13 1015.45 904.17 1208.35 1203.08 1531.43 1678.57 947.59 
Germany            
IBES Forecast 1007.89 611.01 823.98 933.01 929.71 1102.93 1119.36 1061.98 974.28 750.34 766.90 
Adjusted Forecast 694.65 357.05 481.46 588.08 714.29 808.61 880.52 669.25 570.70 483.48 414.03 
UK            
IBES Forecast 1698.32 648.18 713.26 1290.64 1500.88 1901.51 1867.93 1998.58 2091.91 1807.92 1710.98 
Adjusted Forecast 1243.55 550.65 509.81 840.59 1122.77 1097.23 1509.87 1512.77 1515.07 1496.59 1637.73 
N.B.: The MAE (mean absolute error) is defined as follows: ∑
=
−=
T
1t
t
f
t earningsearnings
T
1
MAE , where T 
corresponds to the number of periods in the forecasting, ftearnings  corresponds to the IBES earnings  forecast 
or to the Adjusted earnings forecast and tearnings  is the last earnings forecast before publication. The grey area 
are the cases where we don’t improve analysts’ forecast quality.  
 
Table 6. MAPE Statistics 
 1-24M 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 13M 15M 18M 21M 24M 
US            
IBES Forecast 0.0510 0.0099 0.0198 0.0366 0.0421 0.0534 0.0470 0.0579 0.0612 0.0685 0.0752 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0342 0.0063 0.0148 0.0194 0.0257 0.0289 0.0263 0.0436 0.0434 0.0381 0.0373 
France            
IBES Forecast 0.1117 0.0661 0.0916 0.1147 0.1030 0.1263 0.1182 0.1281 0.1137 0.0960 0.0669 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0691 0.0405 0.0503 0.0751 0.0540 0.0534 0.0677 0.0651 0.0781 0.0774 0.0526 
Germany            
IBES Forecast 0.1051 0.0662 0.0764 0.0818 0.0870 0.1002 0.1035 0.0978 0.1020 0.1114 0.1333 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0704 0.0419 0.0453 0.0564 0.0657 0.0669 0.0773 0.0610 0.0550 0.0682 0.0666 
UK            
IBES Forecast 0.1100 0.0493 0.0452 0.0789 0.0873 0.1105 0.1064 0.1128 0.1289 0.1169 0.1506 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0701 0.0354 0.0269 0.0418 0.0496 0.0501 0.0688 0.0658 0.0718 0.0871 0.1526 
N.B.: The MAPE (mean absolute percent error) is defined as follows: 








−
= ∑
=
T
1t t
t
f
t
earnings
earningsearnings
T
1
MAPE , 
where T corresponds to the number of periods in the forecasting, ftearnings  corresponds to the IBES earnings  
forecast or to the Adjusted earnings forecast and tearnings  is the last earnings forecast before publication. The 
grey areas are the cases where we don’t improve analysts’ forecast quality.  
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Table 7. Theil Statistics 
 1-24M 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 13M 15M 18M 21M 24M 
US            
IBES Forecast 0.0302 0.0051 0.0133 0.0246 0.0259 0.0306 0.0265 0.0372 0.0380 0.0387 0.0417 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0248 0.0028 0.0097 0.0113 0.0179 0.0198 0.0139 0.0250 0.0350 0.0236 0.0259 
France            
IBES Forecast 0.0550 0.0299 0.0441 0.0518 0.0552 0.0673 0.0572 0.0612 0.0619 0.0619 0.0442 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0457 0.0186 0.0274 0.0365 0.0399 0.0312 0.0406 0.0474 0.0640 0.0782 0.0406 
Germany            
IBES Forecast 0.0539 0.0335 0.0438 0.0478 0.0476 0.0583 0.0580 0.0580 0.0610 0.0578 0.0561 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0381 0.0183 0.0247 0.0315 0.0343 0.0443 0.0490 0.0388 0.0400 0.0342 0.0314 
UK            
IBES Forecast 0.0577 0.0190 0.0193 0.0373 0.0456 0.0664 0.0672 0.0715 0.0735 0.0756 0.0796 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0424 0.0165 0.0153 0.0239 0.0357 0.0390 0.0462 0.0461 0.0538 0.0562 0.0754 
N.B.: The THEIL statistic is defined as follows: 
∑∑
==
+
=
T
1t
t
T
1t
f
t )²earnings(
T
1
)²earnings(
T
1
RMSE
U'THEIL , where T 
corresponds to the number of periods in the forecasting, ftearnings  corresponds to the IBES earnings forecast 
or to the Adjusted earnings forecast and tearnings  is the last earnings forecast before publication. The grey 
areas are the cases where we don’t improve analysts’ forecast quality. 
  
We greyed the cases for which our adjusted forecasts are worse than the analysts’ forecasts. We 
observe that our forecasts make it possible quasi-systematically to improve the forecasts of the 
analysts, regardless of the indicator or horizon selected. Clearly, the only exceptions relate to long 
horizons, which is hardly surprising, as the models over these horizons were seen to be poor and the 
only valid explanatory variable was bias observed 12 months earlier.  
In Figures 1 to 4, we deferred the last earnings forecast before publication, the earnings forecasted by 
analysts and the model adjusted for the four main countries of our sample, namely, the United States, 
the U.K., France and Germany. For each year, we deferred the 24 months to 1 month horizons. A 
temporal vision of the forecast adjustment is interesting. It enables us to highlight the fact that some 
years the adjustment is considerable, while it is weak (or even nil) for other years. Note that, in 
theory, the last earnings forecast should be almost constant every year. However, sample structural 
changes explain the non-constancy.  
In the appendix, the tables show the statistical calculation related to the quality of forecasts year by 
year. Again, we greyed the situations for which the correction of the forecast bias does not make it 
possible to improve analysts’ anticipations. The arrows appearing in Graphs 1 to 4 correspond to the 
years for which analysts’ forecasts are better than our bias adjusted forecast, according to the Theil 
criterion. Our forecasts do not surpass analysts’ forecasts in periods of strong earnings growth, in any 
of the countries studied.  
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Figure 1- Last forecast before publication (“published earnings”), Forecasted (“IBES”) and 
Adjusted Earnings (“Adjusted forecasts) for US 
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Figure 2- Last forecast before publication (“published earnings”), Forecasted (“IBES”) and 
Adjusted Earnings (“Adjusted forecasts”)  for UK 
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Figure 3- Last forecast before publication (“published earnings”), Forecasted (“IBES”) and 
Adjusted Earnings (“Adjusted forecasts”)  for France 
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Figure 4- Last forecast before publication (“published earnings”), Forecasted (“IBES”) and 
Adjusted Earnings (“Adjusted forecasts”) for Germany 
 
 15 
Figures 1-4 clearly show the difficulty analysts have in integrating bad news into their forecasts 
during recession periods, for example as in 1991 (biases were larger following the recession in 1990-
1991) or in 1997 and 1998 following the Russian and Asian crises.  
A similar phenomenon was observed in 2001 and 2002 when the already gloomy economic situation 
was exacerbated by September 11th. Following these events, analysts adjusted their forecasts but 
underestimated their impact on future published earnings. These results coincide with those already 
presented. Indeed, bias tends to increase when there is economic decline. The introduction of 
macroeconomic variables into our models is justified: it is observed that in 2001 and 2002 the 
adjusted earnings expectations are more accurate than IBES forecasts.17 
 2003 also shows that in a cycle reversal situation, analysts have trouble revising their forecasts 
upwards, which led to positive surprises in 2003 and the beginning of 2004, especially for the US. 
This phenomenon is likely to be corrected by the activity variables introduced into the model.  
 
Conclusion  
In this paper, we developed a model which provides estimates of analysts’ forecasting bias at the 
individual firm level. We obtain some meaningful results. In particular, the macroeconomic variables 
are statistically significant and their signs are as expected, which contrasts with the findings of 
Dreman and Berry (1995), who found that forecasting errors are not meaningfully affected by the 
business cycle. However, like Harris (1999), we conclude that the microeconomic variables are the 
main explanatory variables; a large share of analysts’ forecasting error is made at the individual firm 
level.  
From the forecast evaluation statistics (RMSE, MAE, MAPE and Theil’U) viewpoints, adjusted 
forecasts make it possible quasi-systematically to improve analysts’ forecasts, whatever the indicator 
and horizon selected. The only exceptions relate to long horizons, which is hardly surprising as the 
models over these horizons were poor and the only valid explanatory variable was bias observed 12 
months earlier.  
Finally, the calculation of the forecast evaluation statistics year by year allows us to observe that the 
bias adjusted forecasts do not surpass the analysts’ forecasts in periods of strong earnings growth, 
regardless of the country studied. In other words, our model corrects the bias when the latter is 
substantial, since in periods of earnings growth, forecast biases are, by nature, reduced. 
 
Appendix. Forecast evaluation statistics year by year 
RMSE 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
US             
IBES Forecast 8484.22 7889.87 4904.25 2611.93 6124.93 1727.31 10335.86 16086.05 9975.75 5764.85 18202.90 24677.07 
Adjusted Forecast 2366.38 2635.51 3884.17 8111.35 20767.41 8187.72 9357.05 7675.36 7709.85 14437.00 6767.55 5565.03 
France             
IBES Forecast 1421.46 2140.88 1851.19 1773.36 1246.25 1215.21 1193.36 778.15 615.04 3859.38 1666.32 4588.32 
Adjusted Forecast 423.44 1156.59 727.51 1433.82 447.03 665.81 2185.13 1072.92 1060.72 4421.76 1526.70 2658.49 
Germany             
IBES Forecast 967.35 1303.36 1325.81 269.23 473.48 482.19 1905.89 609.33 1132.41 2520.64 1684.06 711.08 
Adjusted Forecast 530.18 757.70 705.90 430.81 721.94 900.75 1604.01 539.95 761.73 1308.50 1076.97 595.30 
UK             
IBES Forecast 1879.14 1203.39 352.99 907.56 537.01 438.35 312.59 3494.59 1848.97 2596.03 1575.38 7405.53 
Adjusted Forecast 597.34 376.90 781.09 1307.10 1429.53 1267.12 1540.77 1395.91 1342.21 3231.79 830.24 4641.28 
 
                                            
17We need to be more cautious in evaluating analysts’ bias prior to September 11th, as the forecasts made at the beginning 
of the year 2001 (for the entire year), could not possibly have foreseen the terrorist attacks. It is only natural to attribute the 
bias partially to exceptional events.  
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MAE 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
US             
IBES Forecast 8031.86 7045.65 3653.07 1671.67 5006.74 1271.17 9296.57 14791.96 7841.85 5164.98 16984.26 21547.84 
Adjusted Forecast 1994.00 1746.50 3185.84 6833.48 13638.13 6242.65 6679.72 4825.37 6316.55 10243.57 5231.60 4174.69 
France             
IBES Forecast 1150.42 1930.70 1660.77 1483.26 1186.38 959.39 1067.12 643.34 506.97 3424.84 1333.67 4356.47 
Adjusted Forecast 369.81 1003.64 643.79 996.38 352.21 568.74 1846.48 879.25 838.44 3672.22 1308.52 2369.54 
Germany             
IBES Forecast 740.17 1215.2 1219 239.77 340.55 428.23 1661.68 488.14 1002.75 2244.90 1355.78 511.84 
Adjusted Forecast 436.51 559.63 612.86 322.08 619.75 766.13 1238.51 452.25 632.60 979.29 851.34 452.11 
UK             
IBES Forecast 1660.58 1073.62 276.46 848.03 423.56 408.26 228.85 3236.83 1476.31 2282.88 1419.95 6533.26 
Adjusted Forecast 448.15 277.40 648.93 1148.5 1211.53 1078.82 1274.59 1156.49 1069.56 2582.84 632.11 3533.19 
 
MAPE 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
US             
IBES Forecast 0.0958 0.0767 0.0335 0.0126 0.0301 0.0069 0.0445 0.0759 0.0367 0.0180 0.0684 0.0821 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0245 0.0190 0.0283 0.0511 0.0828 0.0333 0.0320 0.0246 0.0284 0.0365 0.0213 0.0159 
France             
IBES Forecast 0.0927 0.2029 0.2021 0.1525 0.1080 0.0766 0.0597 0.0297 0.0183 0.0946 0.0463 0.1850 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0302 0.1056 0.0789 0.1040 0.0322 0.0428 0.1046 0.0417 0.0307 0.1022 0.0456 0.1006 
Germany             
IBES Forecast 0.1170 0.1994 0.2694 0.0319 0.0393 0.0372 0.1036 0.0370 0.0722 0.1217 0.1092 0.0501 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0681 0.0817 0.1439 0.0438 0.0697 0.0667 0.0782 0.0334 0.0449 0.0518 0.0712 0.0462 
UK             
IBES Forecast 0.3684 0.2019 0.0505 0.0564 0.0222 0.0182 0.0092 0.1461 0.0626 0.0704 0.0395 0.1998 
Adjusted Forecast 0.1316 0.0600 0.1013 0.0772 0.0640 0.0473 0.0509 0.0519 0.0427 0.0776 0.0188 0.1089 
 
U’Theil 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
US             
IBES Forecast 0.0488 0.0415 0.0219 0.0097 0.0188 0.0046 0.0244 0.0402 0.0221 0.0102 0.0360 0.0448 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0144 0.0145 0.0178 0.0310 0.0653 0.0223 0.0227 0.0198 0.0176 0.0261 0.0140 0.0106 
France             
IBES Forecast 0.0558 0.1054 0.1025 0.0837 0.0546 0.0455 0.0350 0.0182 0.0115 0.0562 0.0295 0.0910 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0175 0.0597 0.0431 0.0700 0.0204 0.0263 0.0654 0.0253 0.0198 0.0645 0.0273 0.0549 
Germany             
IBES Forecast 0.0535 0.0868 0.1171 0.0178 0.0263 0.0213 0.0612 0.0233 0.0356 0.0610 0.0684 0.0360 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0310 0.0529 0.0664 0.0292 0.0405 0.0404 0.0507 0.0205 0.0247 0.0327 0.0449 0.0308 
UK             
IBES Forecast 0.1409 0.0948 0.0175 0.0297 0.0143 0.0098 0.0064 0.0743 0.0369 0.0405 0.0224 0.1040 
Adjusted Forecast 0.0500 0.0323 0.0397 0.0430 0.0388 0.0286 0.0321 0.0311 0.0279 0.0507 0.0120 0.0687 
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